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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
EEC - ARTICLE 85-SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTORSHIP AGREEMENTS
MAY NOT INCLUDE PROHIBITION ON EXPORTS
In 1975, price controls imposed by the Belgian government
froze retail prices for new cars in Belgium. Consequently, BMW
prices were lower in Belgium than in other Common Market coun-
tries. This price differential led to the re-export of BMW automo-
biles from Belgium to other countries in the Community; thus,
automobiles which were manufactured in West Germany were ex-
ported to Belgium, then re-exported elsewhere.1 Selling BMW
vehicles to consumers by these re-export channels particularly
disturbed BMW Munich, the parent company. It responded to the
situation by writing to its subsidiary, BMW Belgium, concerning
the detrimental effects of these re-exports of BMW vehicles into
Germany. BMW Munich suggested that dealers should verify that
export sales were only to approved BMW dealers in accordance
with the BMW Belgium selective distribution agreement pending
exemption by the Commission pursuant to Article 85(3). However,
BMW Munich emphasized that "re-exports in themselves do not
constitute a breach, and no objection should be taken to individual
cases."
2
In July 1975, BMW Belgium sent a circular to its dealers in-
dicating its knowledge that dealers had been selling cars in the
Netherlands and Germany. The circular stated that "at a time
when we are having to ration car supplies we can see no justifica-
tion for such sales."' In September 1975, BMW Belgium sent
another circular to its dealers' which was accompanied by a cir-
The re-exports were accomplished in the following manners: (1) buyers in other
Community countries purchased vehicles directly from Belgian BMW dealers; (2) in-
termediaries, not appointed by the manufacturer, handled such imports; (3) dealers which
were not members of the BMW network bought cars from authorized Belgian dealers for
resale to the consumer; or (4) Belgian BMW dealers sold BMW vehicles to approved dealers
in Germany. Local dealers were upset by the situation as they were required to provide
guarantee service on vehicles they had not sold. BMW Belgium N. V. and Belgian BMW
Dealers, O.J. 1978, No. L 46, 33 at 34.
Id.
Id. at 35.
Id The circular of September, 1975, stated:
Henceforth, no BMW dealer in Belgium will sell cars outside Belgium or to firms
who propose to export them. Our solidarity and the protection of our network are
at stake. This absolute solidarity of the BMW network and strict compliance with
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cular from the Belgian BMW Dealers' Advisory Committee.' Both
circulars advocated an export ban. Forty-eight of the ninety
Belgium BMW dealers indicated their support. Upon notification
of the contents of the circulars, BMW Munich expressed its
satisfaction to BMW Belgium. BMW Munich, however, requested
BMW Belgium to bear in mind that "no action may be taken
against your dealers simply because they have re-exported cars.""
Two independent German dealers, purporting to act as agents
for authorized BMW dealers, found it difficult to obtain new BMW
vehicles. BMW Belgium refused to supply these dealers since it
believed that at least one of them was acting on its own behalf and
not as an agent.' Heuer and MGH, the German dealers, thought
otherwise and informed the Commission on October 20 and again
on November 19, 1975, that Belgian dealers were no longer willing
to supply them with new BMW models for re-export. The Commis-
sion began its investigation and, in the meantime, MGH initiated
separate actions against BMW Belgium in the Belgian and Ger-
man Courts." On February 20, 1976, BMW Belgium sent a new cir-
cular to its dealers which stated that the earlier circulars were
merely recommendations and were not to be regarded as instruc-
tions on exports." The Commission held that the agreements
entered into by BMW Belgium, the Belgian dealers, and the eight
members of the Dealers' Advisory Committee infringed Article
85(1) of the Rome Treaty. 10 BMW Belgium and the Belgian dealers
appealed to the Court of Justice. Held, affirmed. These export
this sales policy should be convincing and will help to restore confidence in the
Belgian BMW network.
Id at 36. The Belgian BMW Dealers' Advisory Committee circular advised "no more
sales outside Belgium."
I Id at 37. The letter went on to state that "warnings may be given only where a dealer
is suspected of selling cars to non-approved dealers in breach of this agreement, no action
may be threatened against your dealers unless made necessary by a proved breach of their
agreement."
7Id.
' In the Belgian Court, an amicable settlement was reached on March 11, 1976, which
reflected BMW Belgium's decision to refrain from refusing to sell or allowing to be sold
new vehicles to MGH through the Belgian distribution system. The agreement was on the
condition that MGH limit itself to the role of an agent. MGH's action in the German court
was dismissed. As to Heuer, BMW Belgium sent a letter to Heuer in January 1976, which
stated that "we will not raise any objection in the future to your activity as agent."
Id at 38. In an attempt to rectify its mistake, BMW Belgium stated:
It was not in the past, nor is it now, our intention or that of the Dealers' Advisory
Committee to impose specific instructions on you to prohibit you from exporting.
You are to regard our circular of 29 September 1975 as null and void to the extent
that it might be construed as an export prohibition.
ID Id at 41.
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prohibitions were contrary to a fundamental principle of Com-
munity law, and the fines imposed by the Commission were
upheld in full.11 BMW Belgium N. V. and Belgian BMW Dealers,
O.J. 1978, No. L 46, 33.
Article 85(1) of the Rome Treaty prohibits agreements between
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade be-
tween Member States and which have as their objective the pre-
vention, restriction or distortion of competition. However, Article
85(3) provides that paragraph one may be declared inapplicable if
the agreement meets certain criteria.12 A general principle of
Community law is that an exclusive distribution agreement falls
within the prohibition of Article 85(1).1" Either such agreements
prevent traders from making use of alternative sources of supply,
or they prevent suppliers from making use of alternative distribu-
torship agreements." Certain of these distributorship agreements,
" The Court joined cases 32/78 and 36 to 8278.
I, Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, No. 4300, 298
U.N.T.S. 3. Article 85 provides:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the Common
Market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of under-
takings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States
and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion
of competition within the Common Market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading
conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or invest-
ment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or accord-
ing to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such
contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this article shall be
automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph (1) may, however, be declared inapplicable in
the case of:
-any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
-any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
-any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to pro-
moting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of
the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in
respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
IS C. BELLAMY & G. CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION 213 (2d ed. 1978).
I" Id. at 205.
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however, may be exempted en bloc under Article 85(3) from the
prohibition contained in Article 85(1) pursuant to Regulation No.
67/67.15
One type of exclusive dealing arrangement, the selective dis-
tributorship, limits the sale of products at the distribution stage
to selectively authorized dealers. Thus, dealers outside the net-
work cannot deal in the products in question."6 Frequently, sup-
pliers wish to make use of selective criteria when choosing outlets
for their products. Certain qualitative and quantitative factors
may be utilized in order to insure that products are handled only
by dealers who meet certain technical requirements or achieve
minimum turnover. Qualitative criteria include minimum training
requirements for personnel, maintenance of sufficient stocks, and
the provision for after sales service. Quantitative criteria serve to
limit the number of outlets in any area.17 Such selective distribu-
torships may infringe Article 85(1) and usually do not fall within
Regulation 67/67.18 In such cases, an individual exemption may be
sought by means of notification of the agreement.19 The Commis-
sion alone has the power to grant such individual exemptions as
well as the power to issue regulations exempting certain cate-
gories of agreements. Regulation 67/67, which exempted certain
sale distribution agreements, was adopted by the Commission as
an exercise of this power. 0
" Dam, Exclusive Distributorships in the United States and the European Economic
Community, 16 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 116, 126 (1971). Regulation 67/67 exempts until Decem-
ber 31, 1982, agreements and concerted practices pursuant to which the supplier agrees to
sell only to the distributor for resale within a defined area of the Common Market, or the
distributor agrees to buy only from the supplier, or both.
, E.E.C. COMMISSION, THIRD REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 20 (1974). See also Hahn, Ex-
clusive Distributorship Agreements In the European Common Market: Antitrust Laws on
the Move, 16 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 367 (1973). Hahn advances two arguments in support of the
selective distributorship system: (1) expert handling will allow better marketing and post
sales service; and (2) improved distribution of goods will permit the lowering of prices to
the consumer.
11 LEADING CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE E.E.C. 271 (D. Gijlstra
& D. Murphy eds. 1976).
" BELLAMY, supra note 12, at 227.
" W. ALEXANDER, THE E.E.C. RULES OF COMPETITION 74 (1973).
Id at 15. Thus, the parties to an agreement may seek negative clearance, a declaration
that the agreement does not infringe Article 85(1) pursuant to Regulation 17 which requires
notification of the agreement, or the parties may seek a declaration that the conditions of
Article 85(3) are met and, consequently, the prohibition of Article 85(1) does not apply. The
latter approach was taken by the Commission in the Omega decision, J.O. 1970, NO. L 242,
22; [1970] C.M.L.R. D 49. In an attempt to develop the foreign sales of its watches, Omega
organized a distribution network comprised of exclusive importers, general agents, and a
limited number of retailers. The limitation on the number of retail outlets imposed by
Omega's main distributors, general agents, was by reference to potential demand, not by
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Selective systems of distribution have come under the scrutiny of
the Commission and the Court of Justice. Generally, restrictions
which provide for the selection of dealers based on qualitative
criteria necessary to insure that the goods are sold in a satisfac-
tory manner are allowed.2 ' However, any distributorship agree-
ment which prohibits exports to other Member States strikes at
the essence of the Common Market and will not be permitted.22
The Commission decisions in Kodak,23 BMW Munich," and
Junghans2 emphasize that in order to insure the free movement
of goods between the Member States, products must be able to be
qualification. Although Regulation 67/67 did not apply, the Commission held that an exemp-
tion could be granted to the Omega agreement pursuant to Article 85(3). The Commission
determined that the system of general agents improved distribution and passed on to con-
sumers a fair share of the resulting benefit. Where products are expensive and of a high
quality, it is necessary to limit outlets in order to ensure a sufficient turnover to justify the
retailer's stocking a full range of products and providing service.
" BELLAMY, supra note 13, at 239.
j. CUNNINGHAM, THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE E.E.C. 103 (Supp. 1973).
" Kodak, J.O. 1970, No. L 147, 24; (1970] C.M.L.R. D 19. Kodak had imposed export re-
straints on its subsidiaries by forcing purchasers of Kodak products to buy through the sub-
sidiaries in their respective Member States. If the purchaser went outside his Member
State to purchase Kodak products, the sale was invoiced through the subsidiary in his
Member State at its price, thus pretenting customers from shopping for better terms. The
Commission held that these conditions restricted competition within the Common Market
and adversely affected trade within the Community, since the end result was the isolation
of each Member State's market and the protection of prices charged on each of the markets
from competition from one or more Member States.
24 BMW Munich, O.J. 1975, No. L 29, 1; [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. D 44. BMW operated a distribu-
tion system in Germany consisting of main dealers and retailers. Both groups accepted obli-
gations set out in standard form agreements prescribed by BMW, including an obligation
not to supply BMW products, except certain spare parts, to dealers not authorized by
BMW. BMW selected their dealers on the basis of several objective criteria, including the
quality of the dealer's premises, trained staff, and after sales service. In addition, there was
a quantitative criterion to be determined on the basis of BMW's view of the needs of the
market. Originally, the agreements also prohibited BMW dealers in Germany from deliver-
ing new BMW vehicles to countries other than their own. Although recognizing the restric-
tive effect on competition of the BMW criteria, the Commission exempted from Article
85(1) the agreements of BMW for distribution of its products in Germany upon receipt of
proof that BMW had abandoned export prohibitions that would have applied in the Com-
mon Market. The Commission acknowledged that "such a system may contribute both to
improving the production and distribution of goods and to promoting technical progress."
BMW dealers were free to obtain supplies of BMW products from approved dealers in
other Member States with whom they had no contractual relationships. Although BMW
dealers are not to establish branches outside their own territories, they are not prevented
from advertising or canvassing for business outside their respective territories.
n Junghans, O.J. 1977, No. L 30, 10. Junghans involved the distribution of German manu-
factured clocks and watches through wholesalers and retailers in Germany and through
sole distributors and retailers in the other Member States. Junghans prohibited distribu-
tors in most Member States from directly or indirectly exporting to other E.E.C. countries.
The Commission insisted that these restrictions be eliminated.
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exported or resold for export within the E.E.C. at prices freely
determined by the parties involved."6
The Commission refused to exempt the distribution agreements
in the above cases until the agreements were amended to allow
exports to other Member States. Additionally, the Court of Jus-
tice in Miller v. Commission"7 upheld the decision of the Commis-
sion that export prohibitions in Miller's exclusive dealing agree-
ment constituted infringements of Article 85(1). Miller contended
that because of its weak position on the market, the export pro-
hibition could not possibly affect Community trade.28 The Court
held that the Commission was justified in finding that there was a
danger that trade between Member States would be affected ap-
preciably. In regard to the gravity of the infringement, the Court
stated that "clauses prohibiting exports constitute a form of
restriction on competition which by its very nature jeopardize
trade between Member States."'
The Commission and Court of Justice decisions in Belgium N.
V. and Belgian BMW Dealers further illustrate the Community's
refusal to accept export prohibitions. The Commission imposed
substantial fines on BMW Belgium and forty-eight BMW dealers
which agreed to operate an export ban on new BMW vehicles."
" EEC COMMISSION, FIRST REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 61 (1972).
" Miller v. Commission, [1978] E.C.R. 131 (Case 19/77), [1978] 2 C.M.L.R. 334. Miller pro-
duces records, tapes, and cassettes which are distributed under the Europa and Sonic
labels. In order to distribute in Alsace-Lorraine, Miller concluded an exclusive dealing
agreement with Sopholest in Strasbourg. The agreement contained a clause which pro-
hibited export of Miller products from Alsace-Lorraine to other countries. Miller also im-
posed export prohibitions on domestic and foreign customers.
SId at 151. The Court stated:
[I]n prohibiting agreements which may affect trade between Member States and
which have as their object or effect the restriction of competition, Article 85(1) of
the Treaty does not require proof that such agreements have in fact appreciably
affected such trade, which would moreover be difficult in the majority of cases to
establish for legal purposes, but merely requires that it be established that such
agreements are capable of having that effect.
Id at 152.
See Seventh Report on Competition Policy, April 1978, at 102-03. One circumstance in
which the Commission is entitled to impose fines is where undertakings intentionally or
negligently act in violation of Article 85(1). In determining what fines to impose, the Com-
mission took into consideration the gravity of the offense, the short duration, and the part
played by each party. The Commission determined that the offense was serious because it
compounded restrictions already inherent in a selective distribution system by adding an
export prohibition. The Commission held that BMW Munich had made BMW Belgium
aware of the fact that it was acting in breach of Article 85(1) and imposed the heaviest fine
on BMW Belgium as the instigator of the restrictive scheme. A lesser fine was imposed on
the Advisory Committee due to its reliance on BMW Belgium. In reference to both of these
groups, the Commission considered the fact that the agreement lasted only a short time; ac-
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The export prohibition was not actually within the Belgian BMW
distribution agreement but was called for in a BMW circular and
in a circular issued by the Belgian BMW Dealers' Advisory Com-
mittee. 1 BMW Belgium had notified the Commission of the stan-
dard form agreement entered into by its dealers and had applied
for an exemption under Article 85(3). The standard form agree-
ment contained no export prohibition and simply prohibited BMW
dealers from selling new BMW vehicles to non-approved dealers.2
Although finding that the action of BMW Belgium, the Dealers'
Advisory Committee, and the dealers who signed the circular, vio-
lated Article 85(1), the Commission emphasized its willingness to
exempt selective distribution systems in the motor industry
under Article 85(3) and regarded the inherent restrictions on com-
petition of such agreements as necessary. 3 However, the Commis-
sion stressed that there must not be any other restriction on the
freedom of consumers to buy new cars anywhere in the Common
Market or to effectuate such purchases through agents. "The ex-
port prohibition concerned ... sought to eliminate such pressures
(specifically, competitive pressures to react to differing price
structures) and insulate the market operated by Belgian dealers
for new BMW vehicles from the markets operated by other dealers
for these vehicles in the Common Market.'
The Court of Justice rejected the appeal of BMW Belgium and
the Belgian dealers.n BMW Belgium first complained that the pro-
ceedings could not be initiated on the basis of the complaints of
the two German dealers. The Court disregarded this argument
because the Commission was entitled to institute proceedings
under its own initiative." The Court also rejected BMW Belgium's
contention that the circulars were only intended to remind the
Belgian BMW dealers of the prohibition on selling to non-
approved dealers. The Court concluded:
cordingly, the fines were reduced. The dealers were fined for their negligence in signing
the circulars which they should have realized went beyond the needs of a selective distribu-
tion system. Thus, BMW Belgium was fined 150,000 units of account (approximately
7,500,000 Belgian francs); the eight dealers on the Advisory Committee were fined either
2,000 or 1,500 units of account for supporting BMW Belgium's move for an export ban; the
other dealers were fined a minimum of 1,000 units of account for signing the circulars.
81 See notes 4-5, supra.
BMW Belgium N.V., supra note 1, at 33.
u Most of the clauses in the BMW Belgium agreement are similar to the distribution
agreement of BMW Germany which was exempted by the Commission because there was
no export ban. See note 23, supra.
BMW Belgium N. V., supra note 1, at 41.
" BMW Belgium N.V., supra note 10, at 69.
Sd. at 58.
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The circular from BMW Belgium of 29 September 1975 and the
circular from the Belgian Dealers' Advisory Committee of the
same date, considered according to their tenor and in relation to
the legal and factual context in which they are set and in rela-
tion to the conduct of the parties, indicate an intention to put an
end to all exports of new BMW vehicles from Belgium."7
Furthermore, the Court was not convinced by the applicants'
position that, in spite of these circulars, Belgian dealers continued
to sell new BMW vehicles abroad. The Court noted that the infor-
mation supplied by BMW Belgium in regard to this argument was
not persuasive, because the data supplied to the Court concerned
only twenty-eight cases out of the fifty-nine cases of re-
exportation of which BMW had knowledge between October 1975
and February 1976.1
The dealers' argument that they were unaware of a violation of
the law or agreed to export prohibitions only under pressure was
also rejected by the Court, which found that the dealers sub-
scribed to the agreement by consenting to the circulars. The
Court agreed with the Commission that the dealers were at least
negligent. However, the Court concluded that the Advisory Com-
mittee and BMW Belgium knowingly violated the provisions of
Article 85(1)."
The Court dismissed the application entirely and upheld the
fines imposed by the Commission.'" The dealers claimed their fines
were unjustified because, in previous decisions in which fines
were imposed for violation of Article 85(1), the Commission had
never penalized dealers but only those granting the dealership.
Thus, by treating the Belgian BMW dealers more severely than it
had treated dealers in the past, the Commission discriminated
against the Belgian dealers. The Court rejected this argument,
stating that "the fact that in similar previous cases the Commis-
sion did not consider that there was reason to impose fines on re-
sellers as well cannot deprive it of such a power expressly
Id. at 62. Although the circular begins with a reminder of the terms of the dealership
agreement concerning sales to non-approved dealers, the circular does not distinguish be-
tween non-approved dealers who are not entitled to supplies from Belgian BMW dealers,
and dealers who, by virtue of their status as agents, are entitled to such supplies. More-
over, BMW Munich specifically warned BMW Belgium that no action could be taken against
dealers merely because they had re-exported cars. Yet, it was not until February 1976, four
months after the first circular, that BMW Belgium sent a new circular to all its dealers
stating that the September circular should be regarded as void.
aId
* Id. at 64.
40 Id. at 69.
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granted to it ... where the conditions required for the exercise
thereof are satisfied."" The applicants also were ordered to pay
the costs of the Commission corresponding to the amount of the
fine imposed upon it expressed as a percentage of the total fines.'2
The decision of the Court of Justice insures that consumers and
import agents will continue to be able to obtain new automobiles
outside their Member States, thereby taking advantage of
substantial price differences within the Community.
The Commission has confirmed that selection of dealers by
reference to their technical abilities does not come within Article
85(1) as long as the criteria are applied without discrimination,
such criteria being objectively required in order to insure appro-
priate distribution and after sales service. 8 However, in regard to
the partitioning of national markets by export prohibitions, the
Community has sought to maintain competition between recog-
nized resellers in different Member States with respect to prod-
ucts covered by selective distribution systems. The aim of the
Commission is to "prevent excessive prices by insuring that de-
mand in a Member State can be satisfied by supplies from another
Member State under more favorable conditions. . . Resellers
must be free to take advantage of any price difference in a neigh-
boring country in order to buy their products there at lower
prices."" The BMW Belgium decision illustrates that the selective
distributorship is an accepted mode of distribution in the Com-
munity if it does not hinder competition by an export prohibition.
Unless the effect of restrictions is appreciable, it is unlikely that
the Commission will intervene. Workable competition, although
subject to some restriction, will be achieved through exemptions
of selective distribution agreements under Article 85(3).
Catherine A. Modling
': Id.
u Id. at 70.
, E.E.C. COMPETITION LAW 40 (B. Beckerleg ed. 1978).
" E.E.C. COMMISSION, FIRST REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY, supra note 26, at 61-62.
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